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Concepts of investment incentives and investment neutrality are frequently
analyzed by assuming all taxpayers are subject to a single statutory tax rate witha
fixed schedule of deductions and exclusions. However, most countries incometax
systems are more complex. Income tax systems generally provide a range of statutory
tax rates, allowable deductions may be a function of income, and theremay be
coordination between taxes paid over different points in time through asystem of
tax credits, carrybacks, and carryforwards.
The tax rules which constitute a giyen income tax system may be thought ofas
several parallel tax systems, any one of which may apply to a taxpayer at a given
point in time. A taxpayer who is subject to these different parallel tax systems
over time may face investment incentives very different from those faced by a
taxpayer who is permanently subject to only a single tax system.
In the U.S. there are several examples of parallel tax systems. A graduated
corporate income tax subjects income to four different tax rates ranging from 15 to
39 percent, while a firm in the highest income bracket is taxed at 34 percent. A
firm with losses is subject to a zero tax rate and, if insufficient past tax
liability exists, losses may be carried forward to offset future tax liability.
Another parallel tax is the alternative minimum tax (ANT). As enacted in the 1986
Tax Reform Act, the corporate ANT has a statutory tax rate of 20 percent, its own
depreciation schedules, and its own income exclusions. Taxpayers compute tax
liability under both the regular tax provisions and the ANT, and they pay the larger
amount. The extra taxes paid due to the ANT may be creditable in the future against
regular tax liability.
A tax system (potentially encompassing multiple parallel tax systems) provides
investment neutrality when two conditions are met. First, any asset with a given
stream of receipts (before taxes) should be equally valued after taxes by different
taxpayers. Second, different assets that are equally valued after taxes by a single
-1-taxpayer should offer the same pretax return.
If investment incentives are not neutral across assets and across taxpayers,
the economy suffers real losses. The output attainable from the stock of capital
could be increased if assets were reallocated, taxpayers, in an effort to mitigate
burdens created by differential tax treatment, might be expected to engage in costly
actions. Leasing, mergers, and delaying or accelerating the timing of investment
are ways in which firms can achieve a lower cost of capital, while expending real
resources.
Standard propositions about how to achieve investment neutrality must be
reformulated when taxpayers are subject to different parallel tax systems over time.
Consider the example of expensing. If taxpayers' tax rates do not change over time,
expensing (with no deductions for interest) satisfies the above conditions for
investment neutrality. However, if tax rates change over time, expensing is not
neutral. A taxpayer expensing an asset at a high initial statutory tax rate and
later subject to a lower statutory tax rate will face a lower required pretax return
than another taxpayer permanently subject to either tax rate. Further, the first
taxpayer will no longer be indifferent between assets with different rates of
economic depreciation.
The next section shows that many parallel tax systems share common features and
constructs a general model of the cost of capital based on the Hall-Jorgenson (1967)
cost of capital formula.
Section 3 presents conditions under which a parallel tax system maintains
investment neutrality. In general, the neutrality conditions are sensitive to the
assumed arbitrage conditions and source of finance.
Section 4 presents findings on the effect of the corporate ANT on investment
incentives. It is shown that these investment incentives are sensitive to the
length of time the firm is subject to the ANT, the timing of the Mt spell relative
to the date the investment is acquired, and the source of financing. Investment
-2-incentives for firms experiencing temporaryspellson the ANT can be very different
from those for firms permanently subject to the ANT.Thefinalsection briefly
summarizes the paper.
2.Computing the Cost of Capital with a Parallel TaxSystem
The costof capital of an investment is the necessary pretax return the asset
mustearn to justify its purchase. Derivations typically assume the taxpayer is
subjectto a constant statutory tax rate. If the taxpayer switches to a parallel
tax system, however, the statutory tax rate may be different, depreciation
deductions may be different, and the firins discount rate may be different. In
general, the cost of capital of a firm experiencing a spell on a parallel tax system
is dependent on the duration of the spell, the time at which the investment is made,
and the source of financing.
To examine the effect of a parallel tax system on the cost of capital, the
Hall-Jorgenson (1967) formula is modified to accommodate two tax systems --a
"regular" tax system and a "parallel" tax system. For simplicity, the formula
presented below considers a maximum of two switches between tax regimes. The firm
is assumed to be on the regular tax system from time zero to T1. At time T1 the
firm switches to the parallel tax system. (If T1 —, thefirm never exits the
regular tax system. If T1 —0,the firm starts on the parallel tax system.) At
time T2 the firm returns to the regular tax system. The dates of switches between
tax regimes CT1 and T2) are assumed to be known to the firm and independent of the
marginal investment under consideration.1 If firms are uncertain as to the timing
or duration of the spell on the parallel tax system, the cost of capital found for
each possible pair of T1 and T2 must be weighted by its probability of occurrence.2
Earnings on the regular tax system and the parallel tax system are taxed at a
statutory rate of u and rn respectively. Without any loss in generality, it is
assumed u > m.
The model calculates the cost of capital for investment financed by either debt
-3-or equity. Several arbitrage assumptions are possible to establish the equilibrium
rates of return for these sources of finance, but only one is considered here.
Following Bradford and Fullerton (1981), it is assumed that firms on the regular tax
system are unconstrained in the amount of debt they may issue and arbitrage between
debt and real capital. Therefore, firms on the regular tax system have a nominal
after-tax discount rate of i(l-u). regardless of the source of finance, where i is
the pre-tax nominal interest rate on the firm's debt.3
Firms on the parallel tax system, however, have different discount rates for
debt and equity. To derive their discount rate for equity, assume that individual
savers are indifferent between equity issued by firms on the regular tax system and
by firms on the parallel tax system. Additionally assume that total investment
undertaken by firms on the parallel tax system is small relative to that of other
firms. In this case, equity-financed investment must earn a return of i(l-u) for
both types of firms. Denoting the equity-financed after-tax discount rate at time t
of firms on the parallel tax system by r, r —i(l-u).
To derive the firms' discount rate for debt, assume that bondholders are
indifferent between debt issued by regular tax firms and parallel tax firms. The
pretax cost of debt finance is therefore i for both types of firms. If the parallel
tax system provides a future tax credit for the extra taxes paid under the parallel
tax system, such as under the ncr or tax loss carryforward rules, the after-tax
discount rate of debt finance for a firm on the parallel tax system is time
dependent. This is because interest payments are currently deductible at rate in,
but the firm receives a tax credit of (u-m)i. The present value of this credit
depends on the time at which the credit may be claimed. The debt-financed nominal
after-tax discount rate at time t is r—i(l-ni) -PV[(u-m)i].where flY is the present
value operator from time t to the time at which the credit is claimed.4
A general expression for the cost of capital can be derived for firms
experiencing a spell on the parallel tax system. The model applies with equal
-4-generality to a firm confronting a graduated rate structure •aloss firm with no
carryback ability,5 or a firm on the ANT.
Assumingthat the cost of the asset is $1. the cost of capital c for the
marginal investment is found by equating the asset's cost with the present value of
its after-tax earnings:
(1) $1 —c((1-u) Jei16)tdt
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DB(t) isthe allowable depreciation deduction under the regular tax system for the
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D(t) is the allowable depreciation deduction under the parallel tax system for the
calendar year including t; and the tax credit for extra taxes paid on the parallel
tax system is
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In eq. (1), the cost of capital c multiplied by the ten in braces represents
the present value of the cash earnings of the asset, reduced by taxes paid on each
tax regime the firm faces, and excluding depreciation allowances and tax credits.
The next three terms reflect the present value of the depreciation allowances
received under each tax regime, where ;(t1,t2) is the present value as of time t1
of depreciation allowances received until time t2 under the regular tax system and
Z(t1,t2) is the corresponding expression under the parallel tax system. The
present value of depreciation allowances are computed as shown in eqs. (3) and (4).
Finally, the term -yineq. (1) reflects the tax credit received by the firm for
the extra taxes paid on the parallel tax system relative to the regular tax
liability. The first component V is equal to (1) the after-tax value of the
depreciation deductions the firm would have received had it been on the regular tax
system, reduced by (2) the after-tax value of the depreciation deductions received
under the parallel tax system. W is the tax savings from the reduced taxation of
the direct earnings of the asset while the firm was on the regular tax system. It
is assumed that the credit may be claimed in full the year the firm returns to the
regular tax system.6 Any statutory limit on the number of years the tax credit may
be carried forward is incorporated into the T1 of eq. (5)2
Other special provisions of the parallel tax system pertaining to investments
may also be incorporated. For example, beginning in 1990 under the ANT, a special
tax is imposed on 75 percent of the difference between the ANT depreciation
deduction and a depreciation deduction calculated using yet another depreciation
schedule. The amount of this tax would be subtracted from eq. (1) (with proper
-6-discounting) and added to the tax credit shown in eq. (5).8
Letting t represent the term in braces in eq. (1), the cost of capitalc
can be solved as
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As a special case, if the firm is always subject to the regular tax
system (T1
—øo), eq.(6) simplifies to the traditional Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital formula,
(i(l-u) -r+ 6)(l.uZ(O,c))
(7) c— 1-u
If the firm is always subject to the parallel tax system (T1 —0and T2 —co), then
(r -r+ 5)(] -mZ (0,.))
(8) c — i-m
where r —i(l-u)or r —1(1-rn)if the investment is financed with equity or debt,
respectively.
3. Invariant Valuation under a Parallel Tax System
Samuelson (1964) proved that if and only if depreciation for taxpurposes is
equal to economic depreciation will any two taxpayers with different tax rates value
an asset equally. Sarnuelson referred to this condition as invariant valuation, that
is. the valuation of an asset with a given stream of receipts is independent of the
tax rate of the individual. Samuelson's proof was only for the case of taxpayers
with different, but constant, tax rates. As noted by Sarnuelson,
All of this analysis presupposes a tax rate that is uniform over time
for each person. Obviously, if a man is to be subject to different rates,
with (the tax rate] being a function of time, his optimal decision will be
distorted by this fact. A proper system of carry-forwards and carry-
backs, which makes Ithe tax rate] average out to a constant and which
takes account of just when a man pays the tax accruing to him, will avoid
such
Under a parallel tax system, taxpayers' statutory tax ratesmay change over
time. The conditions under which invariant valuation is maintained in thepresence
of a parallel tax system is examined in this section. Several possible solutions to
the invariant valuation problem are presented.
-7-First, it is shown that even if taxpayers switch between a parallel tax system
and the regular tax system, economic depreciation under both tax systems yields
invariant valuation if Samuelson's assumption on discount rates is maintained.
(Given the arbitrage assumption of section 2. this corresponds to the condition that
the investment is financed with debt.) That is, no tax credits, carryforwards or
carrybacks are required, unlike Samuelson's presumption in the above quote.If
taxpayers' discount rates are set in a manner other than that assumed bySamuelson
(for example, if equity finance is assumed), economic depreciation does not result
in invariant valuation for taxpayers whose tax rates differ either permanently or
temporarily. The necessary relationship between depreciation on the regular tax
system and parallel tax system for invariant valuation in this case is alsoshown.
Second, if the extra tax paid while on the parallel tax system is creditable
with interest against tax due on the regular tax system, then valuation will be
invariant for any method of depreciation under each tax system.
third, it is shown that while expensing (with no interest deductions) leads to
invariant valuation when tax rates are constant, valuation is not invariant when tax
rates change over time, In other words, expensing is fl2.t neutral, even if both the
regular tax system and the parallel tax systems have expensing, if the statutory tax
rates differ. A depreciation system with the same present value as expensing,
however, can be designed that does result in invariant valuation.
3.1 Economic Deoreciation
When taxpayers have diffeçent, but constant, tax rates others have shown
(Samuelson (1964), King (1975), Bradford (1981)) that invariant valuation results if
interest payments are deductible and depreciation deductions are equal to economic
depreciation.'° This solution also holds under a parallel tax system when tax rates
change over time.
Samuelson, King, and Bradford assume that the after-tn discount rate of an
I
investoris equal to the interest rate times one minus the investor's tax rate.
-8This corresponds to the notion of debt-financed investment by firms on a parallel
tax system with no tax credit. In this case, the after-tax discount rate on the
regular tax system and parallel tax system is i(1-u) and i(l-m), respectively.
Lyon (1989) presents a general proof of invariant valuation with economic
depreciation and this discount rate assumption when statutory tax rates change over
time. Under the assumption of exponential economic depreciation, invariant
valuation can be shown by appropriate substitution into eq. (1). If Dt) —D,(t)—
— i(l-m),and—0,then c —I-w+ 6 independent of T and T.
The cost of capital c is the same for all taxpayers independent of the timing and
number of switches to the parallel tax system. Equality of the cost of capital
across taxpayers for a given asset is a necessary and sufficient condition for
invariant valuation. 11
Thus given this discount rate assumption, parallel tax systems with different
statutory tax rates need not rely on tax credits to achieve invariant valuation if
all parallel tax systems provide economic depreciation.
The special assumption required for this result is that after-tax discount
rates vary by a factor of one minus the investor's tax rate. Under the assumption
of equity-financed investment, firms on the regular tax system and parallel tax
system will have equal after-tax discount rates. In this case, economic
depreciation will not result in invariant valuation. If economic depreciation is
exponential, however, a relationship between depreciation on the regular tax system
and depreciation on the parallel tax system can be established that does result in
invariant valuation for this and alternative discount rate assumptions.
Specifically, if the depreciation allowances under the regular tax system are
proportional to the replacement cost of the asset, a depreciation schedule for the
parallel tax system exists that will provide invariant valuation independent of the
duration and number of spells on the parallel tax system.
The requirement that depreciation under the regular tax system be proportional
-9-to the replacement cost of the assetneed not be considered overly restrictive, as
any desired effective tax rate canbe attained undersucha system. specifically.
let the depreciation deduction at time tunderthe regular tax system DR(t)be
*(x-6)t
(9) D(t)
—8 e • where
10' 8*& +(i(l-u)-ff)(l-a)
/ 1-au
In this case, an equity-financed investment by a
firm permanently on the regular tax
system will have an effective tax rateof cu, i.e., the cost of capital
c_[i(l-u)-w)/(lau) +8.By choosing a, any desired effective tax rate canbe
determined.
For equity-financed investment of firms on the parallel tax system,invariant
valuation will result if the depreciation deduction at time tunder the parallel tax
system D(t) is
(11) D(t) —se0flt, where
(12) 6' —c(mu)+u8*
and where c is the cost of capital for a firm on the regular taxsystem)-2 With
these depreciation schedules, the cost of capital c for a projectundertaken by a
firm permanently on the regular tax system will be equal tothat of a firm subject
to the parallel tax system at any point in time. (The proofof this result is given
in Appendix B.)
Under the systems of depreciation allowances given by eqs. (9)and (11), the
reduction in tax liability on the cash earnings of the asset to thefirm on the
parallel tax system is exactly offset at each point in time bythe reduced after-tax
value of the depreciation deductions. As a result, the tax creditowed to a firm
exiting the parallel tax system for the regular tax systemis zero from this
investment. The tax credit can therefore be eliminated and not alterthe solution.
A general relationship between 6' and 6* can be shown to existfor any assumed
relationship between the after-tax discount rate of firms onthe regular tax system




where rR is the nominal after-tax discount rate for firms on the regular tax system
andr, is the nominalafter-taxdiscount rate for firms on the parallel tax
systemJ3 Thus, alternative discountrate assumptions will result in different
depreciationallowances. In the case considered by Samuelson and others where
rR—i(l-u)and thenc—i+6-,r. Substituting these values in eq. (13) with
r—i(1-m),yields 6'—6-w. Decreases in r. such as in the case of equity finance,
will require reductions in 8' relative toeconomic depreciation inorderto maintain
invariantvaluation.
The requirements for depreciation on the parallel tax system to achieve
invariant valuation when depreciation on the regular tax system is proportional to
economic depreciation are given by eq. (13). The obvious drawback of these
relationships is that tax authorities are required to distinguish whether an
investment is financed by debt or equity for firms subject to the parallel tax
system. Since this distinction may not be practical, methods of achieving invariant
valuation that are independent of the source of finance are examined in the
remainder of section 3.
3.2Interest Bearina Tax Credits
Ifthe value of the tax credit earned on the parallel tax system were increased
at the nominal after-tax discount rate of firms on the regular tax system. QiIX pair
of depreciation schedules under the parallel tax system and the regular tax system
will result in invariant valuation, provided the credit is eventually claimed.
Clearly, if firms on the two tax systems have the same after-tax discount rate
(asis assumed in the case of equity-financed investment) this result must obtain
becausethe present value of thetaxes paid from a given investment will be equal.
-11-This result also will hold for debt-financed investments, because,with a tax credit
of this form, the debt-financed discount rate of a firm on the paralleltax system
is equal to that of a firm on the regular taxsystem.14
Invariant valuation may be shown by rewriting the ten reflecting the tax









Substitution into eq. (1) after cancellation of tens yields
(1') $1 —c
((lu)Je
(i(lu) lrl-a)tdt)+ uZR(O.Tl)+udZ(T,T) +uddZR(T2).
After simplifying the terms involving ZR. it can be seen that the cost of capital c
is the same as for a firm permanently on the regular tax system. Allowingthe firm
to earn interest on its tax credit equates the present value of taxes paid bythe
firm with that of a firm permanently on the regular tax system.
In the previous section it was shown that invariant valuation requires that
depreciation deductions on the parallel tax system be determined in a manner
dependent on the source of finance. Only an interest bearing tax creditwill ensure
invariant valuation for any pair of depreciation schedules and independent of the
source of finance, if interest deductibility is maintained.15
3.3 Enensina
King (1975), Bradford (1981), and others have shown that when taxpayershave
different, but constant, tax rates a system of expensing (in the absence of a
deduction for interests payments) will lead to invariant valuation. With a parallel
tax system, however, this result no longer obtains. Firms that expense the asset oil
the regular tax system (the system with the higher statutory tax rate) and later
-12-switch to the parallel tax system will have a lower cost of capital than firms
permanently subject to a single tax system. Similarly, firms that expense the asset
on the parallel tax system and later switch to the regular tax system will have a
higher cost of capital.
This can be seen as follows, With no interest deduction, all firms have the
same discount rate i independent of the source of finance. For a firm always under
only one tax system that expenses an asset, the present value of the pretax earnings
of the asset is $1. since (from eq. (1))
(14) $1 —cfeS)tdt.
For any finite duration from time zero to 1, the present value of the pretax
earnings must be less than $1. But the pretax value of expensing the asset at time
zero is exactly $1. Since this is greater than the earnings of the asset over the
initial tax regime, the firm will have a lower cost of capital if it expensed the
asset at the higher statutory rate of the regular tax system and then switched to
the parallel tax system. Similarly, the firm will have a higher cost of capital if
the order of the tax regimes is reversed. This occurs whether or not a (non-
interest bearing) tax credit is provided.
Expensing, therefore, is no longer neutral for firms experiencing spells on the
parallel tax system of different durations. Further, for a single firm experiencing
a spell on the parallel tax system, expensing no longer results in neutral
investment incentives for assets with different rates of economic depreciation.
Table 1 summarizes the effects of switches between parallel tax systems on the cost
of capital under systems of expensing and economic depreciation.
Neutrality can be restored, however, if a particular depreciation schedule is
used on both the regular and parallel tax systems with the same present value as
expensing. This may appear contrary to most suppositions that only the present
value of depreciation allowances affects the cost of capital. When tax rates change
over time, however, the value of a given deduction is dependent on the tax rate at
-13-that point in time.
If depreciation deductions on both the regular and parallel tax systems at time
t are equal to (5+i.r)e(T6)t, then firms permanently on, or switching between, tax
systems will have a cost of capital c equal to i+5-?, the same as if the asset were
expensed. In this case, pretax cash earnings from the asset at time t are equal to
ce(1S)t —(i÷&.w)e(N&)t.Because at each point in time these earnings are equal
to the depreciation deduction, no taxes are paid on the income generated by the
asset. This result is independent of the tax rate. Therefore, firms switching
between, tax systems have the same cost of capital as firms permanently subject to
either tax system.16
4.Investment Incentives under the ANT
This section examines the effect of a particular parallel tax system, the ANT,
on investment incentives. The ANTisa parallel tax system with its own statutory
tax rate, depreciation schedules, allowable deductions, and tax exclusions. A
corporation calculates its tax liability under both the regular tax system and the
ANT, and pays the greater amount. Extra tax paid on the ANT due to timing
differences between the two tax systems is creditable in the future against regular
tax liability. Dworin (l987b) estimates that at least 20 percent of all
corporations with book income exceeding $1 million are subject to the ANT.
Differences in the computation of alternative minimum taxable income and
regular taxable income for corporations arise in the treatment of both deductions
and income. Deductions may be reduced under the ANT for depreciation, mining
exploration and development costs, intangible drilling costs, percentage depletion,
and charitable contributions of appreciated property. Reported taxable income is
accelerated under the ANT for the completed contract method of accounting and the
installment method of accounting. Additionally, interest on certain tax-exempt
bonds is taxable under the ANT.
While the existence of the ANT cannot lower a firm's total tax burden (or lower
-14-its averafe effective tax rate), the effect on marginal investment incentives is not
immediately evident. Assets generally receive less accelerated depreciation
deductions under the ANT than under the regular tax system, but income from the
asset is taxed at a statutory rate of only 20 percent under the ANT versus 34
percent under the regular tax system. As shown in section 3, only in very special
cases is it expected that the ANT would leave investment incentives unchanged,
Also evident from the discussion in section 3 is the importance of considering
the duration that a firm is subject to the parallel tax system when considering its
incentive and efficiency effects. Several analysts have examined only the case of
firms permanently subject to the ANT. Unfortunately, the cost of capital for a firm
temporarily subject to the ANT is not a weighted average of the cost of capital of
firms permanently subject to the regular tax system and the parallel taxsystem.
Therefore, conclusions drawn from studies examining permanent ANT liability may not
apply in the more likely case of temporary ANT liability.
For example, Graetz and Sunley (1988) find, for a firm permanently subject to
the ANT, investment incentives are greater for most equity-financed investments
relative to those of the regular tax system. For debt-financed investments they
find the opposite effect. Not considered by Craetz and Sunley is the effect on
investment incentives if a firm is only tenrnorarily subject to the ANT. This case
is likely to be far more prevalent. As shown below, some of the findings of Graetz
and Sunley can be reversed in the case of temporary ANT liability.
In considering the efficiency effects of the ANT, Bernheim (1989) finds that
for a firm permanently subject to the ANT its choice of investment may be less
distorted by tax considerations than if the firm were permanently subject to the
regular tax system. Under the ANT, depreciation more closely approximates estimates
of economic depreciation. Firms permanently subject to the ANT face less variation
in the cost of capital (net of depreciation) across diverse assets. Bernheim
therefore suggests that the ANT may actually improve economic efficiency.
-15-Bernheim's finding, however, can also be reversed in the case of firms only
teanorarily subject to the ANT. Thus, the ANT can increase the variation in the
cost of capital faced by a single firm.17
Firms with a higher cost of capital on the ANT than firms on the regular tax
system are likely to reduce investment and engage in tax-motivated merger or leasing
transactions to lower their cost of capital. There is some evidence that firms
disadvantaged by the ANT have increased their use of leasing.18
In this section, the effect of the ANT on investment incentives is examined by
comparing the cost of capital for a firm experiencing spells on the ANT of various
lengths to the cost of capital for a firm permanently on the regular tax system.
Calculations of the cost of capital are based on eq. (6).Eq. (6) is modified to
account for the adjusted current earnings preference of the ANT.19 The adjusted
current earnings preference imposes a tax on 75 percent of the difference between
ANT depreciation and the least accelerated of (I) straight-line depreciation over
the asset's recovery period under the alternative depreciation system or (2) the
depreciation method used for financial reporting. The method which is least
accelerated is determined by a comparison of the present values of depreciation
allowances under the two methods. It is assumed here that the straight-line
depreciation method over the alternative depreciation system recovery period is less
accelerated than the method used for financial reporting.2°
The cost of capital model is calculated in discrete, rather than continuous,
time. As explained in section 2, for firms subject to the ANT for finite periods
the nominal after-tax discount rate for debt-financed investment, r, is time
dependent. As a result, discount factors for periods the firm is subject to the ANT
may not be derived analytically in continuous time.
With eqs. (1) -(6)reformulated in discrete time, parameters may be set for
the variables. The after-tax nominal discount rate for equity-financed investment,
i(1-u), is set equal to .09. This is also the discount rate for debt-financed
-16-investment for firms subject to the regular tax system. The inflation rate ,r is set
so that the real after-tax discount rate for firms on the regular tax system is
equal to .05.(In discrete time, [l+i(l-u)]/(1.i-w) -l —.05)The inflation rate is
approximately .038.
The cost of capital net of depreciation is reported for the aggregate
categories of equipment, structures, intangible capital, inventories and land, and
total corporate capital. The cost of capital for equipment is based on a weighted
average of the cost of capital of 31 different types of equipment. The structures
aggregate is a weighted average of residential and commercial buildings. Intangible
capital is a weighted average of research and development (R&D) and advertising.21
Under the 1986 tax law, recovery periods for equipment under both the regular
tax system and the ANT are generally a function of the assets Asset Depreciation
Range (ADR) midpoint (an estimated service life). Recovery periods under the
regular tax system are up to 50 percent shorter than the ADR midpoint. Most
equipment on the regular tax system is recovered using 200 percent declining balance
switching to straight-line. Long-lived equipment (essentially public utility
equipment) is recovered using iSO percent declining balance switching to straight-
line.
Recovery periods for equipment under the ANT are generally equal to the asset's
ADR midpoint. Depreciation deductions for equipment are calculated using the 150
percent declining balance method switching to straight line.
Structures are depreciated using the straight-line method under both the
regular tax system and the ANT. Under the regular tax system, the recovery period
is 27.5 years and 31.5 years for residential and commercial buildings, respectively.
Under the ANT, both types of structures are recovered over 40 years.
Intangible investments are expensed in the year of purchase under both tax
systems. Finally, land and inventories are not depreciated.
Economic depreciation rates for each asset are based on an approximation of
-17-depreciation rates determined by }iulten and Wylcoff (1981). Hulten and Wykoff
suggest that annual rates of economic depreciation for equipment may be approximated
by the relation 6 —l.65/T,where T is the asset's life as calculated by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Based on an approximate relation between SEA lives and
ADR midpoints, depreciation rates in this study for equipment are calculated as 6 —
l.25/L,where L is the asset's ADR midpoint. Depreciation rates for residential and
commercial buildings are assumed to be .031. Additionally, R&D and advertising are
assumed to have annual rates of depreciation of .15 and .33, respectively.
The following sections present the cost of capital for four different possible
cases. In the first two cases, the cost of capital for a firm permanently subject
to the regular tax system is compared to the cost of capital for a firm permanently
subject to the ANT. The third case is of a firm experiencing an initial spell of
finite duration on the ANT after which the firm returns to the regular tax system.
The fourth case is of a firm initially on the regular tax system that switches to
the ANT for a finite time period, and then returns to the regular tax system. The
cost of capital under each of these four cases can be very different, and also
differs depending on the source of financing for the investment. For each of the
cases, equity-financed investment is examined first, followed by debt-financed
investment.
4.1 Case 1 end 2: Permanent Repular Tax and Permanent ANT Liability
A. Equity Finance
The cases of firms permanently subject to the regular tax system and
Permanently subject to the ANT are presented first. As may be seen by comparing
eqs. (1) and (8), the cost of capital for a firm permanently subject to the ANT is





-18-where the term ACE is included to represent the present value of the extra tax paid
on the investment due to the adjusted current earnings preference. In general,
there is a tradeoff between the lower tax rate at which earnings from the marginal
investment are taxed on the ANT and the less accelerated rate at which depreciation
may be taken under the ANT (as well as the extra tax incurred as a result of the
adjusted current earnings preference).
For investments that are either expensed or not depreciated, eq. (15) is easily
evaluated. For inventories and land, which are not depreciated, the left-hand side
of the equation reduces to (l-u)/(l-m), which is less than 1. Thus, the cost of
capital of these investments is always lower for a firm permanently subject to the
MT. The effective tax rate for inventories and land is equal to the statutory tax
rate under each tax regime. For investments in intangible capital, which are
expensed, the left-hand side of the equation reduces to 1. The cost of capital of
intangible capital is identical for firms permanently subject to each tax regime.
The effective tax rate for intangible investments is zero.22
For other assets, the present value of depreciation allowances under each tax
regime and the adjusted current earnings preference must be explicitly calculated.
Given Z, Z, and ACE, it can be determined whether the cost of capital for a firm
permanently subject to the ANT is higher or lower than the cost of capital on the
regular tax system. As can be seen from eq. (15), the result is independent of the
actual economic rate of depreciation for the asset.
The cost of capital net of depreciation of the different capital stock
aggregates for firms permanently on the regular tax system is shown in column (1) of
table 2. The cost of capital for equipment is 6.8 percent, corresponding to an
effective tax rate of 27 percent. Structures, with less accelerated depreciation,
have a cost of capital of 7.7 percent. This corresponds to an effective tax rate of
35 percent, just exceeding the 34 percent statutory tax rate. Investments in
intangible capital have a 5 percent cost of capital. Inventories and land have a
-'9.7.6 percent cost of capital. The average cost of capital for all assets weighted by
capital stock is 7.1 percent.
The cost of capital for firms permanently subject to the ANT is shown in column
(2) of table 2. For the equipment category, the cost of capital is 6.5 percent.
about 5 percent lower than under the regular tax system. The cost of capital for
structures on the ANT is 6.5 percent, about 16 percent lower than under the regular
tax system. Intangible capital has a cost of capital of 5 percent under both tax
systems. Nondepreciable inventories and land have a cost of capital of 6.25 percent
under the ANT. The average cost of capital for all assets under the ANT is 6.2
percent. The standard deviation in the cost of capital for firms permanently
subject to the ANT, shown in the last row of column (2), is almost one-half that
found for the regular tax system.
The general findings of Graetz and Sunley and Eernheim are replicated in the
computations shown in table 2. The cost of capital of firms permanently subject to
the ANT is generally lower than under the regular tax system and the variation in
the cost of capital across diverse assets is reduced. This analysis might
incorrectly suggest that in all cases the ANT's effect on investment incentives is
relatively modest and that it may even increase investment incentives. This is true
only for most equity-financed investment of firms Dermanently subject to the ANT.
As shown in section 4.2, however, if firms undertake the investment while subject to
the ANT and expect to remain on the ANT only temporarily, investment incentives can
be adversely affected. Further, as shown below, if the marginal investment is debt-
financed, a firm permanently subject to the ANT has a significantly higher cost of
capital.
B. Debt Finance
A firm permanently subject to the ANT financing an investment with debt has a
nominal after-tax discount rate of i(l-m), while the discount rate for firms on the
regular tax system is i(l-u) for both equity and debt finance. The higher cost of
-20-debt finance for a firmpermanentlyon the ANT presents a significant impediment.
Column (2) of table 3 shows the cost of capital for debt-financedinvestments
permanently subject to the ANT. The cost of capital for equipment and structuresis
8.7 percent. The average cost of capital for all assets is 8.5percent.
This cost of capital is 36 percent higher than the cost ofcapital for ANT
firms using equity finance. Relative to regular tax firms, the ANTcost of capital
is higher for all assets, including intangible capital1inventories, and land. A
firm permanently on the ANT required to borrow to finance investmentwill have a
significantly higher cost of capital than a firm on the regular taxsystem.
4.2. case 3: Terorary Initial MIT Liability
The cost of capital for a firm initially subject to the ANT that laterreturns
to the regular tax system is presented in this section. The discussion below
examines investments financed with equity first, followed by debt finance.
A, Equity Finance
To help understand the multiple channels by which an extended durationon the
ANT affects the cost of capital, equity-financed investments in
inventories, land,
and intangible capital are considered first. Because inventories and landare not
depreciable, there is no difference in the after-tax value of deductions taken under
the ANT and no tax effect from the adjusted current earnings preference.Income
generated by these assets while the firm is subject to the ANT is taxed at a rate of
20 percent instead of 34 percent. The current tax savings on thisincome, however,
results in an equal reduction in the fin's ANT credit. The ANT creditgenerated by
investment in inventories and land is negative, and offsets the positive ANT credit
from the firm's other activities. Because the ANT credit is claimedat a later
date, the present value of taxes paid by the firm is lower. As the durationon the
ANTincreases,the cost of capital for these assets declines further. Thelonger
the firmissubject to the ANT, the greater is the reduction in the present value of
-21-taxes paid.
The effect of the ANT on equity-financed intangible capital follows the
analysis of expensing in section 3.3, summarized in table 1.It was shown that if
the firm purchases an asset while subject to the parallel tax system and the firm
later switches to the regular tax, the cost of capital is higher than if the firm
were permanently subject to either taxregime.The gain from the deferral of taxes
on the investment's earnings is less than the loss from the deferral of a portion of
the deduction for the cost of the investment, It is interesting to note that
investment in intangible capital can be deterred even though there is no explicit
penalty for such investments under the ANT for corporations.
The effect of finite initial periods on the ANTforinvestment in equity-
financed depreciable assets introduces more complications because, in addition to
the difference in statutory tax rates in each regime, depreciation schedules differ
and tax may result under the adjusted current earnings preference. The basic
principles, however, are similar to those applying to inventories and intangible
investments.
Column (3) of table 2 shows the cost of capital of a firm that will be on the
ANT for the first five years of a contemplated investment, after which the firm will
be subject to the regular taxsystem.
Equipment has a cost of capital of 7.4 percent, higher than if the firmwere
permanently subject to either tax system. Structures, on the other hand, have a
cost of capital lower than under the regular tax system. Intangible capital has a
cost of capital of 6.0 percent, 20 percent higher than if the firm were permanently
subject to either tax system. Inventories and land have a cost of capital slightly
lower than permanent regular tax liability. The average cost of capital for all
assets is 7.4 percent.
B. Debt Finance
Debt-financed investments of firms initially subject to the ANTbeara
-22-uniformly higher cost of capital than for firmspermanentlyon the regular tax
system. The cost of capital is also higher than for equity-financed investmentsof
ANT firms. The disadvantage ef debt financing relative toequity financing
increases with the length of time on the ANT. For initial durations ofone or two
years the disadvantage is slight, as the after-tax cost of debt finance after
receipt of the ANT credit is nearly equal to that of equity finance. For longer
spells, the discount rate over the initial periods approaches i(l-m).
The cost of capital for a firm subject to the ANT for the first fiveyears of
an investment is shown in column (3) of table 3. A five-year spell on the ANT
increases the firm's nominal after-tax discount rate from 9percent to 9.7 percent
in the first year. The discount rate declines steadily in the next fouryears.
Compared with an identical firm using equity finance (column (3) of table 2), the
cost of capital is only slightly higher with debt finance. The cost of capital of
all assets is also higher than for a firm permanently subject to theregular tax
sys tern.
4.3. Case 4: Te'orary Initial Itepular Tax Liability
The cost of capital for firms initially on the regular tax system that later
experience a spell on the ANT is very different from the cost of capital found in
the previous cases. In general, the effects on the cost of capital are dependenton
the durations on each tax system. As an example of the possible effects, the cost
of capital is calculated for a firm assumed to have an initial period of regular tax
liability of three years, after which it experiences a five-year period of ANT
liability. The firm then returns to the regular tax system. Equity-financed
investment is examined first, followed by debt-financed investment.
A. BattyFinance
In section 3.3 it was shown that fins that expense equity-financed investments
while subject to the regular tax and that later switch to the ANT have a lower cost
-23-of capital than if they remained on the regular tax system. For depreciableassets
it is clear that the same result can occur if depreciation deductionsunder the
regular tax system are exhausted before the firm switches tothe ANT with the lower
statutory tax rate. (Additionally, the firm naybe eligible to receive further
depreciation deductions under the ANT ortaxreductions due to the adjusted current
earnings preference). It may be surprising, however, that evenafter short periods
of regular tax liability, a duration of ANT liability can result in a lower costof
capital.
The cost of capital for equity-financed investments is shown in column (4) of
table 2. All assets are shown to have a lower cost of capital in this case than if
the firms were permanently subject to the regular tax system. The largest reduction
in the cost of capital occurs for intangible capital. The cost of capital for this
asset is 4.5 percent, or an effective tax rate of -11 percent.23 The average cost
of capital for all assets is 7.0 percent.
As noted earlier, Bernheim (1989) suggests that the reduced dispersion in the
cost of capital for firms permanently on the AlITmayhelp improve economic
efficiency. But for firms that first experience a period on the regular tax system
before a later spell on the ANT, the variation in the cost of capital can be
greater. As shown in table 2, the standard deviation in the cost of capitalin this
case is higher than for firms permanently subject to the regular tax system. For
firms experiencing these types of spells, investment decisions may be more distorted
than under the regular tax system.
B. Debt Finance
The higher cost of finance for debt finance increases the cost of capital
relative to equity finance. Column (6) of table 3 shows the cost of capital for
this case. The cost of capital is higher for the aggregate categories of equipment,
structures, and inventories and land than for permanent regular tax liability. The
cost of capital for intangible capital, however, is lower.
24As found above for equity finance, the variation in the cost of capital for
firms with initial periods of regular tax liability is greater than for firms
permanently subject to the regular tax system.
5.Conclusions
This paper has shown the potential for taxpayers to face widely varying
investment incentives when they are subject to different statutory tax rates and
depreciation systems over time. A tax system can provide neutral investment
incentives for a taxpayer permanently subject to a single statutory rate, but very
unequal investment incentives for other taxpayers.
Neutral parallel tax systems can be designed in several ways. Economic
depreciation on each parallel tax system provides neutrality only if all firms have
discount rates associated with the use of debt finance. If discount rates of firms
are different from that assumed in the case of debt finance and if economic
depreciation is of an exponential form, other relationships between the required
depreciation allowances on each parallel tax system can be established. The most
general solution which provides neutrality under any system of depreciation
allowances, any source of finance, and any form of economic depreciation is a tax
credit that increases in value at the after-tn discount rate of firms on the
regular tax system. All that is required is that the tax credit be eventually
claimed.
Withregardto the ANTitwas shown that firmssubjectto the ANTmayhave
either a higher or lower cost of capital than firms permanently on the regular tax
system. The cost of capital for firms experiencing a spell on the ANT is sensitive
to the duration of the spell, the timing of the spell relative to the date the
investment is acquired, and the source of financing.
Firms on the ANT for short durations are likely to have a higher cost of
capital for most equipment. On the other hand, a firm purchasing equipment or other
assets while on the regular tax that later switches to the ANT is likely to have a
-25-lower cost of capital. Investment for which no explicit ANT penalty exists, such as
intangible capital, may be affected by the ANT as m'.sch as depreciable capital.
Firms on the ANT financing investments with debt face a higher cost of capital than
identical firms that use equity financing. The disadvantage to debt finance
increases with the duration the firm is subject to the ANT.
-26-1. Because the formula derives the cost of capital for a small,marginal
investment, these dates are assumed not to change if the marginal investmentoccurs.
Auerbach (1986) examines the effect of inframarginal investmenton the probability
that a firm will have tax losses. In his model, however, capital lastsonly one
period. Dworin (1987a) studies the effect of inframarginal investmenton ANT
liability, but does not examine the differential incentives faced by a firm in
years it is subject to the ANT.
2. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) use such a procedure to calculate effectivetax
rates for firms with tax losses and an uncertain date at which the tax loss
carryforward will be fully utilized.
3. Under this arbitrage assumption, an individual saver, subject topossibly different rates of tax on the return to debt and equity,may receive different
after-tax rates of return from each source of finance. An alternative
arbitrage
assumption is that individual investors arbitrage between debt and equity so that
after-tax returns at the individual level are equated. As notedby Fullerton
(1987), under this alternative assumption, a project financed by equity mustearn a
higher pretax return than if the identical project were financed by debt.
4. In discrete time, the discount rate r for a firm returning to theregular tax
system in one period and receiving the tax credit at the end of the second period
may be derived by finding the discount rate that equates the present value of
payments of interest and principal, less interest deductions and tax credits, with





Discount rates for longer periods under the parallel tax systemmay be solved
recursively as shown in Appendix A. For a firm that will remain permanently on the
parallel tax system (T2 ——). thetax credit is never claimed and the nominal after-
tax discount rate for debt finance is 4—i(l-m) for all t.
S. It can be shown that a firm with the ability to carry back losses to offset
taxes on the regular tax system faces the same incentives as a firm which is subject
to the regular tax system.
6. Firms with large tax credits may be unable to utilize all of them
immediately. For example, the law provides that the ANT credit may not be used to
reduce regular tax liability below minimum tax liability. For a firm with excess
ANT credits, the firm's regular tax liability is equal to its ANT liability. The
firm is essentially still subject to the ANT: an additional dollar of earnings will
increase its current tax liability by 20 cents (m) and decrease its ANT credit by 14
cents (u-rn). Time T2 should therefore be interpreted as the date the firm exhausts
all ANT credits. Provided it is assumed that all AN? credits from the marginal
investment are used at time 12. no further adjustments to the equation are necessary.
-27-7. In the U.S., there is no limit on the number of years the ANT credit may be
carried forward. Tax losses, however, may be carried forward a maximum of 15 years.
To reflect this, T1 in equation (5) should be replaced by T -15if T2 - >15.
8. computations of the cost of capital under the ANT presented in section 4
include this adjustment, referred to as the "adjusted current earnings" preference.
9. Samuelson (1964), p. 605.
10. In the presence of inflation, required depreciation is equal to the nominal
change in the value of the asset. That is, assuming exponential economic
depreciation, the depreciation allowance at time t is (6 -n)e6
-r)ton an asset
with an original value of $1. The cost of capital in this case is c —i
-it + 6,
which is independent of the tax rate.
11. Note that economic depreciation also satisfies the other condition for full
neutrality stated in section one. The pretax return (i.e., the cost of capital net
of depreciation. c -6)of assets with different rates of economic depreciation is
the same for a given taxpayer.
12. If m —0,as with the case of loss firms, invariant valuation can be achieved
for only a single cost of capital on the regular tax system
(c —i(l
-u)
.it + 6).Thus if an effective tax rate other than zero is desired on
the regular tax system, and the parallel tax system has a statutory tax rate of
zero, then valuation will not be invariant.
13. This nay be derived in a manner similar to the derivation for equal discount
rates shown in Appendix B.
14. The equality of discount rates if debt finance is used can be shown as
follows. Footnote 4, which deriveè the debt-financed discount rate r for a firm
returning to the regular tax system in one period and receiving thetkx credit at
the end of the second period, is modified to account for the fact that the credit is
now increased by ifl-u):
I —1+ i(l-m)-i(u.mfll+i(1-u)1
1 + r (1+r )(l+i(l-u))
or rd —i(l-u).By iteration, it can be shown that r' —i(l-u)independent of the
len$h of time the firm is on the parallel tax system
15. Note that while any pair of depreciation allowances will achieve invariant
valuation, the second condition for full investment neutrality may not be met. This
condition requires that different assets equally valued by a single taxpayer should
have the same pretax return. If this condition is met for a taxpayer permanently
subject to the regular tax system, then an interest bearing tax credit will also
satisfy the condition for taxpayers who switch between parallel tax systems.
16. It may be seen that this solution of identical depreciation deductions under
both tax systems is a special case of the depreciation allowance proportional to
economic depreciation given by eq. (12). substituting 6*6+i-w and c—i+6-r into eq.
(12) shows that the solution for 6' is 6'—6+i-w.
17. Additionally, as noted by Graetz and Sunley and Bernheim. economic efficiency
can be impaired by differences in the cost of capital faced by ANT firms relative to
those faced by regular tax fins.
-28-18. Barton (1987) reports the effect of the ANT on leasing at majorcorporations.
An executive at MCI Corporation explained one leasing transaction as follows:"This
is a tax-oriented transaction that we'd rather not discuss. It's notsomething
we'll put in our annual report because we don't want the Internal Revenue Service
jumping all over us... [Wjhat we do with taxes is nobody's business unless we're
required to disclose it in our financial statements."
19. This adjustment does not become effective under the 1986 Tax Reform Actuntil
1990. The model assumes the adjustment is presently in effect. Theadjusted
current earnings preference is symmetric. That is, a negative value for this
adjustment can reduce ANT liability, provided the reduction does not exceed the
increase in ANT liability in previous years that have resulted from thispreference.
20. As a result of this modification, the term ACEd1 is added to thenumerator of
eq. (6). where
ACE —(.75)mfZ(T ,T) -Z(T,T)];and
t
-fr,.dr
Z (t,t )— ID (t) e dt, where SL 12J
St
ti
D5(t)is the allowable depreciation deduction under straight-line depreciation used
for adjusted current earnings for the calendar year including t.
Additionally,because extra taxes paid under the adjusted current earnings
preference are creditable against regular tax liability, the term V in eq. (5) is
modified to
T2 T2





21. Capital stock weights for R&D and advertising and for the composite of total
corporate capital are from Fullerton and Lyon (1988). Weights within the categories
of equipment and structures are derived by the author based on unpublished
Department of Commerce data.
22. Fullerton and Lyon (1988) examine the tax treatment of intangible capital in
more detail. No account is made in the present paper of the incremental tax credit
for qualifying R&D activities under the regular tax system. (This creditmay not be
used against ANT liability.) The effective tax rate for R&D should therefore be
considered as appropriate only for R&D activities not eligible for the credit.
23. For shorter durations on the regular tax and longer durations on the ANT,
The cost of capital for intangible investments can be negative! That is, the output
from this investment discounted at a real interest rate of is less than its cost.
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-R2-Appendix A
This appendix shows how the after-tax discount rate for debt-financed
investments of fins on the parallel tax system may be derived in discrete
time. Discount rates are calculated from time T1 to T2. If 12 is finite and
a tax credit is provided, these discount rates will be time dependent.
Let the one-period nominal pretax rate of interest be i.It is assumed
that firms borrow at the beginning of each period, pay interest and receive a
tax deduction at the end of each period, and receive the tax credit at the
end of the first period the firm returns to the regular tax system.
The nominal after-tax discount rate of a firm on the parallel tax system
for only one period may be calculated by finding the discount rate that
equates the present value of payments of interest and principal, less
interest deductions and future tax credits, with the proceeds of the loan.
That is, r is defined such that
T2







where u and m are the statutory tax rates under the regular tax system and




The discount rate for periods on the parallel tax system of more than
one year may be solved in a similar manner. For example, the discount rate
for the period preceding time T2 may be solved as
i(u-m) (A.3) r —i(l-m).___________________ (l-t-r)(i+i(l-u))
A-iIn general, each period's discount rate may be derived iteratively using
the formula
(A.4) r —i(l-m)- i(u-m)
I-j i-i 2 II(l+r ))(1-14(1-u)) I-t
t—o 2
A-2Appendix B
This appendix derives the relationship between depreciation on the
regular and parallel tax systems required for invariant valuation of equity-
financed investment.
Depreciation deductions on the regular tax system are D(t) —s*e6)t
and 0(t) —6,8NS1t•The relationship between 6* and 8' is established
below to be 6' —(c(m-u)+ uE*)/m, for iii0.
The cost of capital for a firm permanently on the regular tax system may
be derived from eq. (1) for T1 —•. Substitutingfor Dt) yields
(B 1) $1 —c(l-u)+uS*
r-r+8 r-t+6'
The cost of capital c of an equity-financed investment for a firm on
both the regular tax system and a parallel tax system may be derived from eq.
(1), .±ter substituting for DR(t)andD(t):
-(r-w+6)T1







Subtracting equation (B.2) from equation (B.l), assuming the cost of





B-iThe term in curly braces is positive for all T2 >T1,so the equality in
equation (8.3) occurs only when 6' is defined as above.
As noted in the text, the tax credit given this 6* and 8' is zero. The
tax credit is represented by the last term in equation (B.2). As can be
seen, under the solution for 6' given by equation (3.3), the tax credit has a
value of zero for all T1 and T2.
3-2TABLE 1
Changeinthe CostofCapital Relative to
Permanent RegularTax Liability
PermanentParallel Tax Liability: Equity
1.Economic Depreciation
4
2. Expensing, no interest deductions —




2.Expensing, no interest deduction t t




2. Expensing, no interest deductions 4 4
Key: —— nochange in cost of capital
4 —lovercost of capital
—highercost of capital
Assumes regular tax statutory tax rate u is greater than parallel tax
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